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Households’ Preferences and Willingness to Pay for Hydrological Services in Veracruz, Mexico 
By 
Ian McGinnis 
University of New Hampshire, May 2019 
 
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are transfer payments from governing bodies, 
households, firms, or non-governmental organizations to incentivize natural resource owners and 
managers to carry out environmental conservation efforts that promote the provision of 
ecosystem services. PES programs targeting reduction of deforestation have gained popularity 
due to the extensive ecosystem services of forests including carbon storage, wildlife habitat, 
biodiversity, and the provision of hydrological services (HS), the ecosystem services that provide 
benefits such as water quality improvement, water damage mitigation, and non-use value.   
 There is evidence in the literature that PES programs, while theoretically beneficial, face 
issues with long-term financial sustainability (Nava-Lopez et al., 2018). An increase in financing 
can be achieved through the introduction of a fee in the water bill of water users. However, these 
fees are often chosen arbitrarily1 without any rigorous assessment of households’ willingness-to-
pay (WTP) for HS provided upstream (i.e., by forest landowners upstream from the cities) and 
little is known about the preferences of these households. This paper aims to estimate the value 
consumers have for HS through the use of a choice experiment (CE). The use of a CE allows us 
to elicit the preferences of the consumers of HS with respect to both the cost and the attributes of 
the PES program. We choose the state of Veracruz to conduct the CE because it is one of the 
                                               
1For instance, the city of Coatepec charges 2 pesos (~10 cents) per month. 
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most intensely deforested states that also struggles with both water quality and water damage 
issues. (Nava-Lopez et al., 2018).  
 We developed and administered an in-person, tablet-based CE in October 2018 which 
used five attributes to describe the hypothetical Payments for Hydrological Services (PHS) 
program: Water Quality, Water Regulation Services, Eligible Land, Program Administration, 
and Fee. We obtained a sample of 777 observations, split between representative samples of 
Xalapa and Coatepec, the two cities of the state that have experience with hydrological PES 
programs. Water Quality and Water Regulation Services are the two attributes thought to be the 
main benefits that consumers would be interested in. Eligible Land has a policy implication 
because local governments are interested in increasing the eligibility to include shade-grown 
coffee. Program Administration will allow us to estimate whether consumer’s support for such 
PES program depends on the type of institution managing it. Fee is a variable with options 5, 20, 
40, and 80 MXN per month, the amount added to household’s water bill to pay for the program.   
 In this thesis, we construct conditional logit and mixed logit models to analyze discrete 
choice data. The results show that for the four non-monetary attributes, the utility function 
parameters of the coefficients are positive, showing respondents propensity for an improved 
program. The sign of the Fee coefficient is negative, showing consumers demand for lower 
prices. Further, the coefficients of Water Quality and Water Regulation Service are higher than 
those for Eligible Land and Program Administration, showing that respondents care more about 
improved results than the organizational structure of program delivery. A key difference between 
Coatepec and Xalapa is the Eligible Land variable. It is significant for Coatepec while 
insignificantly different from zero in Xalapa. With Coatepec being more of an agricultural small-
town and Xalapa being a larger city, it intuitively makes sense that Xalapa would not care about 
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the land enrolled in the program, and Coatepec would. Both cities do care about the Program 
Administration variable, with Coatepec having a coefficient twice the magnitude of the 
coefficient Xalapa.  
 Our research has shown that the downstream water users in an area serve as a viable 
option for substantially extending the financial base of a PHS program. Evaluating the total 
economic value of ecosystem services and revising the level payments to landowners are two of 
the key policy improvements that are recommended in the future in order to make PES programs 
in Mexico more effective and efficient (Lara-Pulido, 2018). Our results also highlight the need to 
take local perceptions as well as income inequality into consideration in the design and 
promotion of PHS programs.  
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
Motivation and Objectives 
Land use change and deforestation are increasing due to urbanization and agricultural 
intensification. These changes have a negative impact on the ability of land to provide clean and 
reliable water supplies to downstream communities (Martínez et al., 2009). This negative impact 
is the result of a market failure, an inefficient provision of the services that the forest land 
provides. The market failure occurring is a negative externality, a cost incurred by the 
downstream communities that do not choose to experience it and is caused by the landowners not 
internalizing the full costs of their decisions. To combat this market failure, Payments for 
Hydrological Services (PHS) programs have been established to pay landowners to not deforest 
their land. However, these programs have issues with financial sustainability.  
The purpose of this paper is to characterize household preferences for a PHS program as 
well and derive welfare measures for the program attributes, and for the program as a whole. We 
collected the survey data using an in-person, tablet-based choice experiment (CE) and asked 
participants to make choices among PHS programs that vary based on their impacts on water 
quality and regulation as well as program administration changes. Through the analysis of the 
choice’s individuals make, we examine the tradeoffs between the outcomes of the program (i.e., 
improved water quality and water quantity regulation) and the administrative structure of the 
program (i.e., who administers the program and whether SGC lands are eligible) and price. We 
estimate a conditional logit model to estimate the probability of a program being chosen based 
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on the associated program attributes; and also account for individual heterogeneity through a 
mixed logit model. 
 
Hydrological Services 
The world’s ecosystems provide numerous services that are vital to the health and well-being of 
humans (Costanza et al., 1997; de Groot et al., 2012; MEA, 2005). Hydrological services (HS) 
are terrestrial ecosystem services that affect freshwater resources, which have a direct impact on 
water quality and availability to humans. These can be put into five categories: (1) improvement 
of extractive water supply, (2) improvement of in-stream water supply, (3) water damage 
mitigation, (4) provision of water-related cultural services, and (5) maintenance of aquatic 
habitat. These services have an effect on the landscape in the quantity, quality, location, and 
timing of flow of water (Brauman et al., 2007). A recent review of hydrological service literature 
found that a significant portion of peer-reviewed journal articles link the effects of hydrological 
processes on the landscape, but do not effectively make the link between hydrological services 
and the people that are affected by them (i.e. downstream water users). However, making this 
link is critical to pursuing rigorous watershed management practices (Brauman, 2015). 
 
Ecosystem Service Conservation 
Hydrological services are affected by land use change. Increasing deforestation rates due to 
urbanization and agricultural intensification has negative effects on the ability of the land to 
capture and filter the water running through a landscape (Martínez et al., 2009). The undersupply 
of forest-generated hydrological services is due to a failure in the market for these services. This 
is a consequence of the fact that there is a discrepancy between the private value of forests from 
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the viewpoint of private landowners, and public good value of the forests. More specifically, 
private landowners do not internalize the full costs of deforestation and thus will underprovide 
hydrological services to the market. A wide-range of policies have been implemented. Most 
commonly governments develop protected areas or forest management units as a central planner 
approach to the issues. Also, reforestation projects, education initiatives, and other community 
integrated conservation projects have been attempted. However, governments typically fail to 
provide the optimal level of hydrological services and funding issues limit their ability to 
conserve adequate land. Political pressures decrease the effectiveness of these measures as well 
because important industries such as agriculture and timber profit from the deforestation and 
land use change that occurs. All of these measures have two issues: they are costly to the 
implementing agency and they do not address the underlying issue of market failure (Bishop, 
Pagiola, and Landel-Mills, 2002).  
 Market-based mechanisms, in an environmental conservation context, are measures taken 
to establish a market for the goods and services provided by the natural environment by 
providing incentives for conservation in an effective manner. Examples of market-based 
mechanisms include pollution charges which tax the environmental bad at the source, tradable 
permits which forces polluters to pay for their pollution, and payments for ecosystem services 
Zhang, 2013). These mechanisms attempt to correct market failures by either (1) increasing the 
benefits of conservation to forest landowners or (2) produce resources that can subsequently be 
used for conservation efforts. Market-based mechanisms have their own set of issues that may 
provide sub-optimal outcomes but offer increased effectiveness over command-and-control 
measures at a fraction of a cost (Bishop, Pagiola, and Landel-Mills, 2002).  
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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are a market-based mechanism in which the 
suppliers of the services that ecosystems provide are paid by the consumers of these services. 
PES programs targeting reduction of deforestation have gained popularity due to the extensive 
ecosystem services of forests including carbon storage, wildlife habitat, biodiversity, and the 
provision of HS. These mechanisms are transfer payments from governing bodies, households, 
firms, or non-governmental organizations to incentivize natural resource owners and managers. 
The goal of PES is to carry out environmental conservation efforts that promote the provision of 
ecosystem services. These payments can address failures occur in the market for environmental 
goods that are typically undervalued and therefore undersupplied (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder, 
2008).  
PES programs are a market-based mechanism that theoretically meets the following 
criteria: (1) a voluntary transaction where (2) a well-defined ecosystem service (3) is being 
bought by an ecosystem service consumer (4) from an ecosystem service supplier (5) if and only 
if the supplier secures ecosystem service provision (Wunder, 2005). 
The first criterion, voluntary participation, is necessary to ensure that ES providers have 
land-use choices. Second, the ES being bought needs to be well-defined. This is especially 
important in the provision of HS because the results of the program (e.g. cleaner water, increased 
water availability) may not be readily measured. For example, this could result in a Payments for 
Hydrological Services (PHS) program being defined as paying for the conservation of land that 
is likely to improve the provision of HS, a measurable and enforceable transaction. Any PES 
should have resources going from ES buyers to ES suppliers, by definition. Finally, a PES 
scheme should be contingent on the service being provided continuously, meaning buyers should 
be able to pull out if they are not receiving the services they are paying for (Wunder, 2005). 
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Deforestation and PHS programs provide a clear context to study how PES programs may be an 
effective form of conservation because hydrological benefits are provided by upstream 
landowners, but the benefits go to the downstream water users (Bishop, Pagiola, and Landel-
Mills, 2002). This creates a naturally occurring market-place for these services, while also 
presenting the challenge that decisions are made in an area geographically disconnected from 
where they have the largest effects. 
While theoretically beneficial, PES programs face a number of issues that must be solved 
to create long-term social and environmental gains. In the last 30 years, hundreds of PES 
programs have been implemented worldwide. Costa Rica was the first in the world to establish a 
nationwide PES program and continues to be the frontrunner in PES schemes of the developing 
world. The Costa Rican government developed a national program in 1997 that offered monetary 
payments to landowners to avoid deforestation on their land, paid for through a fossil-fuel tax. 
Costa Rica was successful in combating the deforestation trend of the 1990’s, however, it is 
unclear whether the program had a causal impact on deforestation as it was enacted at the same 
time as other environmental and economic programs with similar goals. While the additionality2 
of the program is unclear, there is evidence that program enrollees have higher forest land cover 
rates and the program seems to have induced reforestation efforts by landowners (Pagiola, 2008). 
However, not every program achieves the same success. For example, a study of 40 PES 
watershed services programs in Latin America yielded that only 57.5% (23/40) were considered 
successful. Grima et al. (2017) defined program success as either meeting and/or exceeding its 
stated goals, or as adding value in terms of ecological, economic, or social wellbeing. They also 
assert that the following four criteria may increase the likelihood of a program being successful: 
                                               
2 Additionality is defined as “the measure of outcomes in relation to what would have occurred in the absence of 
intervention.” (Sommerville, Jones,& Milner-Gulland, 2009) 
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(1) provide a crucial resource while simultaneously contributing to local livelihoods, (2) operate 
on a local or regional scale, (3) use in-kind contributions in addition to cash payments, and (4) 
involve private actors and reduce middle-men between buyers and sellers of the ES (Grima et al., 
2017). PES can be implemented to conserve a number of ES. In this thesis, we focus on the 
conservation of land to provide hydrological services in the context of Veracruz, Mexico. 
 
Ecosystem Service Valuation 
As contributors to the welfare of humans, ecosystems represent a significant economic value 
(Costanza et al., 1997). In recent years, there has been significant resources devoted to the 
quantification of the value ES around the world. Costanza et al. (1997) find that the world’s ES 
are valued at an average of $33 trillion/year, $4.7 trillion of which is forests which have an 
average value of $696/ha/year and are the primary providers of the total global climate regulation 
ecosystem services and a significant provider of the global water regulation ecosystem services.. 
Lara-Pudillo, Guevara-Sanginés, Martelo (2018) provide a more specific analysis by looking at 
the value of ecosystem services in Mexico and find that the value of the ES of forests in Mexico 
is $291/ha/year. Hydrological services of forests include water capture and filtration, flood 
control, timber, and recreational opportunities. Theoretically, a PHS program will help to 
maintain the provision of these ES and thus have significant economic value to the ES 
consumers. 
 
Valuation of Hydrological Services in Central and South America 
The majority of the economic research on the valuation of hydrological services uses the 
Contingent Valuation (CV) method. CV is a nonmarket, stated preference valuation method that 
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asks consumers their maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for a good or service. According to a 
meta-analysis of the ecosystem service valuation literature in Mexico, 43% of the studies were 
CV (Lara-Pudilo, Guevara-Sanginés, Martelo, 2018), while the rest were a mix of market price 
analyses, meta-analyses, travel-cost studies, and other methods were less represented including 
choice experiments which only represented 3% of studies. CV studies can help determine the 
feasibility of PES/PHS programs, estimate the welfare increase of hypothetical or existing 
programs, and provide an estimate of the price that consumers may be willing to pay for a 
program (Whittington and Pagiola, 2012). Numerous studies have estimated this WTP in Central 
and South America. Vasquez et al. (2009), in a study of Parral, Mexico, estimate that households 
are willing to pay between 1.8 and 7.55% of their household income, per month, to ensure safe 
and reliable drinking water. Another CV study uses a hypothetical new filtration system that 
would remove fluoride and arsenic from the groundwater in Guadalupe, Mexico, and find that 
consumer in the region would be willing to pay 56.55 Mexican pesos (MXN) (3.00 USD) for the 
removal of arsenic and 66.37 MXN (3.52 USD) for the removal of fluoride (Dávila, 2013). Other 
studies have found a WTP that ranges from MXN 32.63 (1.73 USD) /month to MXN 136.92 
MXN (7.26 USD)/month depending on factors such as household income and survey type 
(Almendarez-Hernandez et al., 2013; Ojeda et al., 2008). 
 The literature is large enough that there have also been meta-analyses done on the 
contingent valuation method to value forest ecosystem services. Barrio and Louriero (2010) 
analyze the results of 35 CV studies that focus on consumers WTP for forest ecosystem services. 
They find that while consumers have positive WTP for these services, they are sensitive to the 
objectives of the proposed program. Other factors that affect WTP include socio-economic 
variables, question format, and type of forest. Another meta-analysis, Whittington and Pagiola 
 8 
(2012) review 25 CV studies, most of which attempt to estimate the downstream water user 
demand for upstream watershed protection in Latin America. Their review asserts that while CV 
studies have potential to improve hypothetical and existing PES programs, many CV studies can 
be improved by attempting to reduce hypothetical bias and most lacked policy relevance.  
 
Overview of Mexico’s PHS Programs 
A significant amount of deforestation occurred in Mexico between 1993 and 2000, where 
approximately 8.2 million ha of forests were converted to intensive land uses such as agricultural 
fields and pastures (Velásquez et al., 2002). In 2001, the environmental minister of Mexico 
gathered a team of politicians and academics to explore the possibility of starting a program to 
address Mexico’s deforestation issues. They used Costa Rica as a model but decided that water 
user-fees would be a more salient option rather than a tax on fossil fuels. Water user-fees provide 
an easier link between the providers and the consumers of the HS. Specifically, landowners are 
providers of HS because the conservation of forested land helps to regulate and filter that water 
that reaches the downstream water users, the HS consumers (Carvalho-Santos, Honrado, & Hein, 
2014). The program was finally established in 2003 with the Mexican Congress earmarking 
2.5% of water fees to be used to fund the program, implemented by the National Forestry 
Commission (CONAFOR). After one year, in 2004, the budget was increased from $30 million 
to $100 million (Cameron, 2015).  
Under the program, both private and communal farmers are eligible for payments of 
approximately $25-35 per-hectare-per-year (Cameron, 2015). Ejidos are a federally recognized 
property holding that are communally governed among several households.  Ejidos made up 
more than half of the enrolled land in the initial cohort of the program while the rest was made 
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up of private landowners. Upon acceptance, landowners must not change the land cover of any 
enrolled parcels and are subject to satellite image analysis and ground visits for inspection 
purposes. If landowners are found to be in violation of the program agreements, payments stop 
(Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008).  
In 2008, local programs known as “Matching” programs were established. These 
programs matched local funds with national funds in order to diversify the funding source of the 
program as well as begin the transition from national to local programs. Under this new 
mechanism, 50% of the funding would come from CONAFOR and the remaining 50% would 
need to come from local water fees, governments, or private entities. The transition to local 
programs was touted as an improvement by connecting the HS producers (landowners) with the 
HS consumers (water users) (Nava-López et al., 2018). 
 
Veracruz, Mexico 
The study area in this paper is comprised of the cities of Xalapa and Coatepec in Veracruz, a 
state in central Mexico along the Gulf of Mexico. As one of the most intensely deforested states 
that struggles with both water quality (Macauley, Harwell, & Alafita, 2007) and water damage 
issues (Ellis et al., 2012), Veracruz serves as a perfect area to study the preferences of residents 
for a program to help conserve the forests that provide their HS, including water quality and 
water regulation HS.. This, coupled with the fact that it was an initial area used to test both the 
National and local Matching programs, makes Veracruz an ideal model for making policy 
recommendations to improve current programs based on our results. Xalapa and Coatepec both 
fall in the Antigua River Watershed. Xalapa gets 40% of their water from the Pixquiac sub-
watershed and the rest from the Huitzilapan. Coatepec gets their water entirely from the 
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Gavilanes sub-watershed. Known for their cloud forest cover, about 65% of their original forest 
cover has been converted to agricultural uses (Asbjornsen et al., 2017). The land change has 
hydrological consequences for both the quality and quantity of water that reaches the 
downstream water users of Xalapa and Coatepec. 
 In 2001, Coatepec historically established the first PES program in Mexico in response to 
a 1998 water shortage that was the worst in the city’s history. A voluntary fee was paid by local 
residents in their water bill. This money was used to pay forest landowners in the watershed to 
not deforest their land, if they volunteered. Because it was the first of its kind, national 
lawmakers used the Coatepec program as a model for the national program. However, when the 
sitting mayor left Coatepec, mismanagement of funds and political issues led the program’s 
premature ending (Cameron, 2015). 
Xalapa established their first watershed protection program in 2005, paying $90 per 
hectare per year which is triple the national program amount. The municipal leaders sought to 
reduce deforestation and damaging farming practices in the Pixquiac watershed, the primary 
watershed that Xalapa’s residents rely on for safe and reliable drinking water. This program was 
established by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Senderos y Encuentros para un 
Desarrollo Autónomo Sustentable (SENDAS) with the primary goal of developing a program 
that protects the resources of the watershed by bringing together the interests of both the 
downstream ES consumers (i.e. water users) and the upstream ES suppliers (i.e. farmers and 
landowners). They aimed to do this by providing benefits to the forest landowners in form of 
monetary payments and benefits to the citizens by improving the quantity regulation and quality 
of water provided (Cameron, 2015).  
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 The water quality and damage issues that Veracruz has experienced has led to the 
establishment of PHS programs and environmental education campaign in the last 20 years. 
Thus, many residents have knowledge of PHS programs that attempt to deal with these issues. 
This makes Veracruz, and the difference between the preferences of Coatepec and Xalapa, an 
ideal study site for a hypothetical PHS program. These programs, particularly in Coatepec, have 
suffered from administrative pitfalls and financial mismanagement, highlighting the fact that 
future programs must be carefully planned in terms of administrative structure, land eligibility, 
and fees in order to produce an effective and sustainable future.  
 The difference between Xalapa and Coatepec lie in their cultural and economic 
characteristics, as well as their experience with hydrological issues and PHS programs. Also, the 
watersheds play an important role in the community support of the program. Coatepec’s 
watershed is located within the municipality’s jurisdiction, so the funds from a matching 
program would go to citizens of the city. This contrasts with Xalapa whose water comes from 
two separate watersheds, one of which extends into the neighboring state of Puebla, causing a 
disconnect between the funding source and where the funds end up. Coatepec also has a 
significant cultural difference of being unofficially designated as the “coffee capital of 
Veracruz.” This implies an important cultural relationship that the citizens of Coatepec have with 
coffee farms. Households in both cities are equally familiar with the hydrological issues that 
deforestation has caused in the state as well as the programs that have been established in order 
to combat these issues. Another contrast of the cities is the percentage of their population that 
works in agriculture. According to the Intercensal (2015) data, 10.93% of Coatepec’s population 
works in agriculture whereas only 1.39% of Xalapa’s population does.  
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Attributes of a PHS Program 
Institutions that establish PHS programs have considerations including payment amount, 
payment method, funding source, land eligibility, and many others. In the context of providing 
hydrological services to household water consumers, we consider the most important outcomes 
of the programs to be whether it improves consumer’s water quality and reduces their flood and 
drought risk (i.e., improve their water regulation). Further, we hypothesize that consumers also 
care about institutional aspects of the program such as the type of implementing agency and the 
land that will be eligible for the program. There are results from the literature that support the 
claim that consumers value the results from these programs (Abdulkarim et al., 2017; Hensher, 
Shore, & Train, 2005), but little is known about how household consumers might value attributes 
related to program implementation.  
 The key outcomes of the programs are the improved water quality and improved water 
regulation services provided to downstream consumers. Historically, Mexico’s PHS program 
focused on procuring a steady water supply in areas where water scarcity is worst (Muñoz-Piña 
et al., 2008) but does not take water quality consequences into consideration. Also, there is a lack 
of empirical evidence on where payments should be targeted within watersheds in order to 
maximize hydrological service provision (Alix-Garcia et al., 2012; Manson et al., 2013). The 
water contamination issues resulting from deforestation have led to a rise in gastrointestinal and 
other diseases associated with a lack of access to potable water in Mexico. This, in turn, has 
increased public health costs (Ishii & Sadowsky, 2008; Pattanayak & Wendland, 2007; and 
Schwarzenback et al., 2010). 
The administration of the program is crucial to the long-term support and efficiency of 
any PES program. With respect to this, there has been some work done on the preferences of 
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participants (i.e. landowners and other ES suppliers) of the implementing agency of PES 
programs. A lack of trust in the agency which implements the program can reduce the level of 
participation in the program, especially when long-term contracts are at stake (Adhikari and 
Boag, 2013; Jones et al., 2017). However, if downstream consumers are considered to be an 
additional funding source, support for the administrative agency of the program cannot be 
understated. In fact, the institution of the program can even strengthen the consumers’ awareness 
of ecosystem conservation in the presence of PES programs (Corbera, Soberanis, & Brown, 
2009). Public perception and support are especially important for a program, especially in a 
context like Mexico where 90% of citizens believe the government is corrupt, according to the 
National Survey of Quality and Government Impact (ENCIG, 2017).  
 Targeting specific land, such as land with high deforestation risk, has been touted as a 
strategy to improve the effectiveness of PES programs (Börner et al., 2017; Wunder, 2015). One 
land use that can affect the provision of HS is shade-grown coffee. Intensive sun-grown coffee 
systems may increase the risk of groundwater contamination by chemicals (Cannavo et al., 2011) 
and have other negative hydrological consequences for surrounding watersheds (Zimmerman, 
Elsenbeer, & De Moreas, 2006). Combined with the significance of coffee to the culture and 
economy of Mexico, the addition of shade-grown coffee land to the eligible land of a PHS 
program can be an attribute of interest to respondents. On the other hand, because SGC can 
provide less HS than forests, households might not be supportive of expanding the land 
eligibility to this land use category. 
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Thesis Overview and Contribution 
The contribution of this work is that it is one of the first to use a choice experiment to measure 
the value of hydrological services in Mexico while utilizing both program outcome and program 
administration variables. Using a hypothetical PHS program, we test the hypothesis that 
consumers have significant willingness to pay for the outcomes of these programs (i.e. improved 
water quality, fewer floods and droughts) by including these as attributes in our CE. We also 
include program organization and delivery attributes to test the hypothesis that consumers are 
willing to pay for improved program administration aspects such as incorporating an NGO or 
expanding the program to include shade-grown coffee lands. Shade-grown coffee systems have 
been shown to provide additional hydrological services, compared to intensive, sun-grown coffee 
(Zimmerman, Elsenbeer, & De Moreas, 2006). We consider the program administration variable 
to be key because not only have programs failed due to institutional failings, but there is 
evidence that significant distrust of the government exists in Mexico (Meschoulam et al., 2015) 
and improving these aspects of the program has significant consequences on program 
sustainability. A substantial body of work has also focused on the supply side of ES by 
examining which program designs maximize participation by the suppliers of ES (Jones et al., 
2019; White & Hanley, 2016). For example, White and Hanley (2016) find that depending on 
information availability, it may be advantageous to pay for ecosystem service inputs rather than 
outputs, meaning paying for conservation efforts rather than ecosystem service improvement. 
This is because output-based contracts provide no guarantee that ecosystem service providers 
will be compensated for their efforts and are also more difficult to enforce for regulators. Jones 
et al. (2019) test the hypothesis that there are non-financial motivations for the participation in 
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PES programs and find that social and environmental motivations do affect the decision for 
households to participate in a PES program in Veracruz, Mexico. 
 There are several choice experiments that attempt to measure the value of safe and clean 
drinking water. Dauda, Yacob, and Radam (2015) measure consumers’ marginal valuation for 
water quality level, total water supply, and tap water pressure. Similarly, Hensher et al. (2005) 
measures households’ WTP for drinking water service using water service interruptions 
frequency, length, and timing, with fee, to see how households are willing to pay for their 
drinking water service attributes. These papers measure households’ WTP for drinking water 
quality and quantity without referring to the hydrological services of forests, a key input in the 
provision of safe and reliable water supply in forest watersheds.  The most similar paper to ours 
is Abdulkarim et al. (2017) who estimate households’ preferences for a watershed services 
program in Malaysia. They use a choice experiment with the attributes: ecological functions, 
water quality, water quantity, and fee. Notably, these papers all neglect to consider program 
organization attributes which we consider to be our key contribution.  
 The paper is structured in the following way: Chapter II reviews the relevant literature 
with respect to the valuation of hydrological services. Chapter III describes the survey design 
process and the data collection. Chapter IV contains the theoretical discussion of discrete choice 




Chapter II. Methodology and Data 
 
Survey Development 
We developed a choice experiment which used five attributes to describe a hypothetical 
Payments for Hydrological Services (PHS) program: Water Quality, Water Regulation Services, 
Eligible Land, Program Administration, and Fee. The final version of the survey can be found in 
Appendix A. We selected these attributes through consultation with researchers familiar with the 
PES programs in the state. The survey was tested in two focus group meetings in the cities of 
Xalapa and Coatepec, Veracruz, Mexico during July 2018. Water Quality and Water Regulation 
Services are dummy-coded variables where a 1 indicates an improvement in their current 
situation for option j and a value of 0 indicates otherwise. These two attributes are thought to be 
the main benefits that consumers would be interested in. Eligible Land is a dummy-coded 
variable that takes the value of 0 if only forest  
land is eligible for the program and a value of 1 if shade-grown coffee lands will also be eligible. 
We included this variable because local governments are interested in increasing the PHS 
eligibility from forests only to include shade-grown coffee. Program Administration is a 
dummy-coded variable where a 0 indicates the Government will administer the program, and a 1 
indicates the Government will work with an NGO to administer the program. Given a history of 
government mistrust, including this variable would allow us to estimate whether consumers’ 
support for the PES program depends on the type of institution managing it. Fee is a variable 
with options 5, 20, 40, and 80 MXN per month, the amount added to household’s water bill to 
pay for the program. Currently, there is a $1.00 MXN surcharge on residential water bills in 
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Coatepec and no surcharge in Xalapa (Nava-López et al., 2018), which may make these values 
seem arbitrarily large. However, the upper bound was determined by focus group meetings 
which was the maximum willingness-to-pay of participants for a program that offered the most 
attractive levels of each attribute. Table 1 describes the attribute levels. 
Table 1: Attributes of PHS Programs 
Product Attribute Levels 
Water Quality Improved 
No Change 
Water Regulation Service Improved 
No Change 
Program Administration Government + NGO 
Government 
Eligible Land Forest + Shade-grown Coffee 
Forest 
Price (MXN) 5, 20, 40, 80 
 
Experimental Design 
With four attributes of two levels each and one attribute of four levels, a full-factorial design 
would require respondents answering 64 questions each, which is not feasible. Instead, we use an 
Orthogonal Main Effects Design (OMED). This design implies that none of the main effects (i.e. 
attributes) are correlated with any of the other main effects in the study and therefore it is 
assumed that any interaction effects are negligible (citation). With 4 x 24 factors, we use a 27 
OMED design that consists of 8 choice sets (Conniffe, Lorenzen, & Anderson, 1995). These 
were randomly divided into two blocks of four choice sets for each respondent and each 





We hired The Center of Studies of Opinion and Analysis of the Universidad Veracruzana to 
administer an in-person, tablet-based choice experiment in October 2018. Participants in Xalapa 
and Coatepec were sampled in order to obtain representative socioeconomic traits among them. 
To do this, each municipality was divided into three zones based on their level of known 
characteristics such as education, health, housing, and household goods. A stratified sample size 
was then calculated based on the size of the three zones, classified from lowest to highest level of 
socioeconomic standing, and households were randomly sampled in order to complete this 
sample size. Screening questions were used to ensure that each respondent is over the age of 18 
and is in charge of the water bill for their household. The latter question was used to ensure that 
we were reaching the target population of consumers that pay their household water bill. Then, 
each respondent was given information on the background of PHS programs Mexico, the 
hydrological services provided by forests, and the purpose of the survey.  
 Following the screening and introductory information, participants were asked questions 
regarding their environmental preferences and awareness of their water source such as “Do you 
volunteer or contribute to an environmental NGO?” and “Do you know the watershed of your 
city?” Respondents were then introduced to information about the attributes followed by four 
pairs of hypothetical PHS program options, one at a time, and asked to choose their preferred 
program, including an “opt-out” program which would cost nothing but also provide no 
additional benefits. A sample choice task used in the survey is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Example Choice Card 
 
 Stated preference surveys are known to be subject to hypothetical bias. In an attempt to 
mitigate this bias to the best of our ability, we included an opt-out reminder, a budget reminder, 
and a cheap talk script, all of which have been shown to minimize hypothetical bias. Another 
important consideration to ensure incentive compatibility in the survey is the payment vehicle 
and how it is presented to the survey respondent. For example, open-ended questions are known 
to not be incentive compatible, and payments being considered as potentially mandatory improve 
incentive compatibility (Johnston et al., 2017). 
 Following the choice experiment, participants were asked if they ignored any attributes 
when answering the choice tasks. This is used to test for evidence of attribute non-attendance, a 
common problem in choice experiments that consumers do not consider certain attributes in their 
decision-making. This concern is typically minimized through proper survey design and utilizing 
focus group meetings but should be tested for validation of results. Subsequently, participants 
were asked about their level of trust of the government, and the combination of the government 
and an NGO, to administer a PHS program. This question was put after the choice experiment to 
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avoid biasing subjects on their choice task responses. The survey concluded with demographic 
questions. 
 
Chapter III. Empirical Models 
 
Discrete Choice Models 
The theoretical framework of a CE was established by Lancaster, which recognized that 
consumers derive utility from the attributes of goods, rather than from only the goods themselves 
(Lancaster, 1966). This approach is especially useful when the good or service at hand is 
complex and requires multiple attributes to describe, such as a PES program. Econometrically, 
choice experiments require the use of discrete choice analysis (McFadden, 1974), which is 
rooted in the theory of the random utility model (RUM) (Thurstone, 1927); the idea that 
consumers maximize their utility perfectly, but it is based on factors which are both observed and 
unobserved in the data. Mathematically, we can describe the RUM model as an equation which 
is the sum of systematic and random components for individual i choosing choice j as: 
𝑈"# = 𝑉(𝑥#, 𝑝#, 𝑧") +	𝜖"# Equation 1 
In Equation 1, the deterministic (observed) components of consumer i’s utility from 
choice j is V, which is a function of xj, a vector of choice attributes, pj, the price of option j, and 
zi, individual characteristics. The nondeterministic (unobserved) component is ϵij. Assuming a 
conventional linear utility model, we can define V as: 
𝑉"# = 𝛽𝑥# + 𝜆𝑝# + 𝛾𝑧" +	𝜖"# Equation 2 
Where λ is the marginal utility of income.  
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 In the model, we make the usual random utility maximization assumption according to 
which consumer i chooses alternative j if he or she maximizes their utility relative to all other 
alternatives in the choice set C such as the following holds: 
𝑈"# > 𝑈"3	∀	𝑗 ≠ ℎ ∈ 𝐶 Equation 3 
 
Conditional Logit 
First, we define Yij as the dependent variable which takes on a value of 1 if the consumer 
chooses alternative j and a value of 0 if they do not, defined as follows: 
𝑌"# = 	 ;
1	𝑖𝑓	𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟	𝑖	𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠	𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑗
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
In the most basic conditional logit model, probability of consumer i choosing alternative j is: 





 The odds ratio of two alternatives, j and k, is, by definition in Equation 4, unaffected by 
some other alternative m. This property is known as the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), and while it provides convenience in estimation, it places restrictions on 
consumer behavior which are not especially practical. Another shortfall of the conditional logit 
model is that it cannot represent preference heterogeneity. Specifically, the b’s in Equation 2 are 
assumed to be fixed across the population. The mixed logit model is traditionally used to allow 
for preference heterogeneity by allowing the b’s to vary across the population. The main 
approach to addressing the issue of IIA is the nested logit model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; 




We can relax the assumption of fixed b’s in the conditional logit model to allow for preference 
heterogeneity. This is known as the mixed logit or random parameters logit model (Train, 1998). 
This model assumes that the parameters of the model are randomly distributed in the population 
and preference heterogeneity is captured through the estimation of the mean and standard 
deviations of the parameters. This allows us to set the following equality: 
𝛽𝑥# = ?̅?𝑥# + 𝛽\]𝑥# Equation 5 
In Equation 5, ?̅? is the population mean coefficient and 𝛽 is the individual deviation from the 
mean. This leads to the following linear utility function of individual i:  
𝑉"# = ?̅?𝑥# + 𝛽\]𝑥# + 𝜆𝑝# + 𝛾𝑧" +	𝜖"#	 Equation 6 
 In this case, xj is still attribute characteristics, not including price, but now the parameters 
are assumed random. We keep price as a fixed coefficient because allowing it to vary may lead 
to a flat likelihood function that does not converge and it also affects the welfare measures so it 
is recommended to keep it fixed (Revelt & Train, 1998). Now, ?̅? is the population mean and 𝛽 is 
the individual deviation from the mean. The probability of person i choosing alternative j is still 
defined as in Eq. (4), except that now b varies across individuals. 
It is standard to assume a normal distribution for the coefficients, which is what we will 
follow for our mixed logit estimation.  
 
Welfare Measures 
The strength of CEs is the ability to quantify the consumer tradeoffs between attributes of the 
good being valued. Specifically, we are able to estimate the amount that consumers would be 
willing to pay for each attribute of the hypothetical PHS program because we have estimated the 
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indirect utility function. Because we have estimated a linear utility function, the willingness to 
pay for each attribute is the ratio of the partial derivative of the utility function with respect to the 











In addition, we can estimate the compensating variation of consumers, the amount that they 
would be willing to pay to remain at the same utility that they were before the hypothetical 




Z − 𝑉e] Equation 8 
Where V1 is the utility of the new state where each attribute takes on the changed level (1) and V0 
represents the utility of the base case. 
 
Alternative Specific Constant 
We also introduce a constant, specifically an Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) into the 
models. The ASC captures the average effect of unobserved factors on the choice and is a 
dummy variable coded for 0 for the status quo and 1 for the two hypothetical PHS programs. The 
value of the ASC is that a positive coefficient will tell us whether there is status quo bias, the 
result that respondents prefer the status quo option regardless of program attributes. The ASC 
can also be interacted with individual characteristics so that we can model heterogeneity at the 
individual level. We will interact the ASC with socioeconomic characteristics as well variables 




Chapter IV. Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the survey sample are shown in Tables 2 and 3, showing demographic 
characteristics and respondents’ awareness of PHS Programs and other hydrological services 
variables, respectively. We collected these in order to verify that our sample is representative of 
Veracruz. They also serve the purpose of understanding how individual preferences for a PHS 
program vary based on their demographic characteristics, previous experience with PHS 
programs, and recreational tendencies. The individual characteristics of income, age, gender, 
education level, along with whether the respondent uses forest for recreation, will enter the 
model by interacting with the alternative specific constant to see if there are characteristics that 











Table 2: Awareness of Hydrological Services 
  Entire Sample Xalapa Coatepec 
Are you aware of any programs 
providing Payments for Hydrological 
Services in Mexico? 
Yes 3.35% 2.55% 4.16% 
Do you know the watershed of your 
city? Yes 10.57% 7.42% 13.77% 
Does your water bill currently have an 
additional fee for Payments for 
Hydrological Services programs? 
Yes 5.15% 2.05% 8.31% 
Do you contribute to or volunteer for 
an environmental non-profit or NGO? Yes 4.9% 4.9% 4.94% 
Have you used forest land for 
recreation (hiking, camping, fishing, 
etc.) in the last 12 months? 
Yes 52.97% 49.09% 56.81% 
  
According to Table 2, respondents were not particularly aware of PHS Programs in 
Mexico. Also, the majority of our sample was not aware of the watershed of their city nor did 
they contribute to any environmental NGO’s. These results are surprising given the prevalence of 
these issues and PHS program history in the region. However, it is consistent with our focus 
group experience. One purpose of asking these questions was to gauge their experience with the 
product, as respondents that are more familiar with the hypothetical product are less prone to 
hypothetical bias. We still believe that our results are consistent and the description of the 
program and its attributes at the beginning of the choice experiment was used to ensure all 
respondents have a baseline level of information. A significant portion of our respondents do use 
forests for recreational activities. This variable will be used in the choice analysis because 
individuals who recreate in forests should be more willing to pay for a program that attempts to 
conserve the land that provides recreational opportunities, in addition to providing hydrological 
services.   
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Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of Sample 
  Entire Sample Xalapa Coatepec 
Income < 2,500 MXN 31.31% 31.20% 31.43% 
 2,500 – 5,000 MXN 26.55% 24.55% 28.57% 
 5,000 – 7,500 MXN 16.11% 16.11% 16.10% 
 7,500 – 10,000 MXN 8.89% 9.46% 8.31% 
 10,000 – 15,000 MXN 4.90% 5.63% 4.16% 
 > 15,000 MXN 5.80% 7.16% 4.42% 
Mean Age  43.85 44.85 42.86 
Sex Male 46.07% 45.41% 46.75% 
 Female 53.93% 54.59% 53.25% 
Education Level Without Elementary School 10.44% 8.44% 12.47% 
 Elementary School 17.27% 15.09% 19.48% 
 Junior High School 19.33% 18.93% 19.74% 
 Senior High School 25.13% 26.09% 24.16% 
 Technical School 5.54% 5.88% 5.19% 
 University Degree 18.81% 20.97% 16.62% 
 Graduate Degree 3.35% 4.35% 2.34% 
Employment Status Employed full-time 22.81% 23.53% 22.08% 
 Employed part-time 13.92% 13.81% 14.03% 
 Independent Contractor 24.61% 23.53% 25.71% 
 Houseworker 20.23% 18.16% 22.34% 
 Student 3.99% 8.95% 4.42% 
 Retired 5.80% 5.63% 5.97% 
 Unemployed 5.67% 5.88% 5.46% 
Household Size Adults (>18) 3.32 3.22 3.42 
 Children (<18) 1.29 1.21 1.38 
N  777 392 385 
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There were 777 respondents in our sample, 392 from Xalapa and 385 from Coatepec. As 
can be seen by Table 3, the demographic characteristics of the Xalapa and Coatepec samples are 
very similar. Differences include that the average of Xalapa has a slightly higher income, which 
may influence average welfare measures across the cities. Xalapa also has an older sample and 
has more respondents in the higher educated categories. Both of these variables may also 
contribute to differing WTP measures across the cities because age and education may play a 
role in how consumers view the program, past programs failing, and whether they would be 
willing to accept a fee in their water bill to have this program. Unfortunately, the exact 
demographic questions we asked to the sample are not available from current data sources. Using 
the Intercensal data from 2015, we attempt to compare our sample area to the demographic 
characteristics of the area. Compared to the Intercensal (2015) data, which can be found in Table 
4, our sample has a substantially older mean age than the true population. Also, our sample 
seems to be less employed and has lower education level compared to the general population. 
The income level is difficult to compare across data sources because the bins are different. Our 
sample seems to have a lower income than the general population because our sample has a large 
portion belonging to the below 2,500 group whereas the census data has a much less in the 2,100. 
This is important because these variables enter into the model as an effect on whether the 






Table 4: True Demographic Characteristics of Sample Area 
  Xalapa Coatepec 
Income1 < 2,100 MXN 7.60% 10.38% 
 2,100 – 4,200 MXN 24.56% 29.98% 
 > 4,200 MXN 57.67% 47.63% 
 No answer 10.16% 12.01% 
Mean Age  32.35 32.24 
Sex Male 47.11% 47.65% 
 Female 52.89% 52.35% 
Education Level Without Elementary School 4.05% 7.04% 
 Elementary School 19.24% 26.96% 
 Junior High School 4.10% 4.73% 
 Senior High School 16.63% 18.77% 
 Higher Education2 55.68% 42.38% 
Employment Status Employed 49.82% 52.50% 
 Unemployed 2.42% 1.95%% 
 Not Economically Active3 47.75% 45.40% 
Agricultural Workers  1.39% 10.93% 
Population  480,841 92,127 
Data obtained from the 2015 Intercensal report 
1 Bins calculated based on the national minimum salary which was 2,100 for 2015 
2 Higher education encompasses any education obtained after High School 
3 ‘Not Economically Active’ encompasses all persons aged 12 or older who are 
not working traditionally i.e. students, retired, etc. 
    
 
Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the conditional logit and mixed logit are presented in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively. Each table has three models that differ by the sample: Xalapa, Coatepec, and 
pooled. Presented results show the estimated utility function parameters of the attributes, as well 
as the alternative specific constant and individual characteristics interacted with the ASC. 
Because each attribute is a dummy variable, the estimated parameter can be interpreted as how 
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that attribute affects the probability that a respondent chooses a program with that attribute 
having the value of X=1. Most attributes are significant and take on the expected sign. Because 
each attribute represents an improvement in the program, we see a positive sign for each attribute 
and a negative sign for the price variable. There are no significant differences between the 
conditional and mixed logit models, so the rest of the discussion will focus on the mixed logit 
results for simplicity and because mixed logit is an extension of conditional logit model by 

















Table 5: Conditional Logit Utility Function Parameters of Choice Set Attributes 








































































N 9276 4656 4620 
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.135 0.153 
Log-likelihood -2940.721 -1474.329 -1433.528 
LR Test Statistic for Data Pooling 65.728***   
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 








Table 6: Mixed Logit Utility Function Parameters of Choice Set Attributes 










































































N 9276 4656 4620 
Log-likelihood -2466.488 -1219.786 -1229.655 
LR Test Statistic for Data Pooling 34.078***   
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
Likelihood ratio (LR) tests were performed for the conditional and mixed logit models to 
determine whether the data should be pooled or split. This serves as a test of whether Coatepec 
and Xalapa are significantly different in their estimated preferences for a PHS program. The 
conditional logit LR test statistic is 65.728 and the mixed logit LR test statistic is 34.078. Thus, 
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data pooling is rejected at .01 (𝜒ZZ,.eZi = 24.72). This result suggests that the sample should be 
split, and results are dependent on the city which the respondent lives in. Therefore, we present  
all estimation and welfare analyses with Coatepec and Xalapa as separate results.  
 
Table 7: Standard Deviations of Random Parameters 
VARIABLE Full Sample Xalapa Coatepec 
































































Clustered standard errors in parentheses 








Table 8: Trust of PHS Administration 
 Xalapa Coatepec 
 Government Government + NGO Government 
Government 
+ NGO 
I do not trust this entity to 
administer the program 43.73% 20.72% 42.34% 18.44% 
I trust this entity a little to 
administer the program 31.97% 34.78% 33.51% 34.55% 
I trust this entity a 
moderate amount to 
administer this program 
20.46% 37.08% 20.00% 37.66% 
I trust this entity a lot to 
administer this program 3.32% 7.16% 3.64% 8.05% 
 
Both cities have positive, significant estimated coefficients for the improved Water 
Quality and Water Regulation Service variables, which is expected as the consumers would be 
more willing to choose a program that provides these key outcomes to them. What is a more 
interesting finding is the significance and magnitude of the Program Administration variable, 
also positive and statistically significant. This variable is consistent across all models and sub-
samples. The difference lies in the magnitude; the Program Administration variable for Coatepec 
is twice as large as that for Xalapa. This follows our expectation that the consumers have some 
distrust of the government and have a higher probability of choosing a theoretical PHS program 
which has NGO’s working with the government to administer the program. In addition to this, 
Table 7 shows the results of the survey question which asked respondents to rank their trust in 
the entity administering a PHS program. These results support the fact that consumers have a 
higher level of trust with the addition of an NGO to the administration of the program, but 
overall have a low level of trust for anyone to administer this program. Coatepec has a slightly 
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higher level of trust, overall. This may help drive the result that they have a higher mean 
willingness to pay for the program. 
The preferences of Coatepec and Xalapa diverge at the Eligible Land variable. This 
variable measures the incremental value that consumers place on adding shade-grown coffee to 
the eligible land of the PHS program versus limiting the eligibility to forests. This variable is 
statistically significant and positive for Coatepec, while not statistically significant for Xalapa. 
This can be explained by the fact that Coatepec is one of the oldest coffee-producing regions in 
Mexico and it is tied to their culture and identity, so the residents would have a greater interest in 
having shade-grown coffee being eligible for the PHS payments (Hausermann, 2014). This can 
be contrasted with Xalapa, a large city where the residents may be more disconnected from the 
coffee culture of the area.  
The Alternative Specific Constant (ASC) variable is negative and significant at the 1% 
level in all mixed logit models and significant at the 5% level in all conditional logit models 
except in Xalapa. This variable suggests that consumers widely prefer a program, regardless of 
the attributes, over their status quo situation. Individual characteristics cannot enter the model 
independent from the ASC because they have no within-individual variation and the conditional 
logit model requires this, so the model is a function of the characteristics of the choice rather 
than the individual. When ASC is interacted with individual characteristics, Age has a positive 
and significant coefficient in most models which suggests that older respondents are more likely 
to choose the status quo option. The best interpretation of the income3,  variable is that in 
Coatepec, higher income households are more likely to choose a program, regardless of 
                                               
3 We also tested the hypothesis that being a low-income household would have a significant interaction with ASC.   
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attributes, whereas higher income households’ in Xalapa are more likely to choose the status quo 
option.  
We also include estimated standard deviations of the random parameters in the mixed 
logit model in Table 7. Many of the program variables do not have significant standard 
deviations while the Alternative Specific Constant interaction variables do. The significance of 
the ASC interaction terms of Gender, Age, and Recreation implies that these variables are 
randomly distributed in the sample. The insignificance of the program attribute variables implies 
that the parameters may be fixed, and that the conditional logit model is a sufficient estimation, 
or that the normal distribution is not the correct assumption. In future analyses, we may consider 
making these program variables fixed and re-estimating the model.  
The welfare estimates of each attribute, separated by city, are reported in Table 8. As 
defined in Equation 7, these estimates are derived from the estimated utility function parameters 
of the model. The mean welfare measures for each program are easily interpreted as the value of 
an incremental change because each attribute is represented as a dummy variable in the model 
and thus the estimate is the value that the mean respondent is willing to pay for the X=1 value for 
that attribute, with respect to their status quo of X=0 of the given variable. The mean welfare 
estimates are similar between the conditional and mixed logit models. Between cities, Xalapa has 
slightly lower WTP measures than Coatepec among all attributes. The most significant 
difference between the cities, again, is the estimated welfare measure of the Eligible Land 
attribute, with Xalapa residents being willing to pay less than 2 MXN for that attribute, while 
Coatepec residents are willing to pay up to 23 MXN. The Program Administration variable has 
significant WTP. Each model shows that the mean welfare measure for the Program 
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Administration variable is 30-70% of the welfare measure for the Water Regulation Service 
variable, which is considered the key outcome of the program. 
Table 9: Estimated Welfare Measures for Each Program Attribute 
 Conditional Logit Mixed Logit 
VARIABLE Xalapa Coatepec Xalapa Coatepec 
Water Quality 42.89 63.55 41.99 56.72 
Water Regulation Service 34.90 50.12 35.21 47.06 
Program Administration 12.13 34.90 13.18 31.30 
Eligible Land [1.87] 23.64 [1.1] 19.77 
N 4656 4620 4656 4620 
Values reported in 2018 MXN. 1 USD ≈ 19 MXN. 
Welfare measures of coefficients insignificant at the .1 level are designated with square brackets. 
 
The overall value of the program, which is defined by Compensating Variation (CV) in 
Equation 8, is reported, split by city, in Table 9. This measure is consistent across the conditional 
and mixed logit models, with Coatepec having a higher overall WTP than Xalapa. Compared to 
their household income, residents are willing to pay between 2-5% of their monthly income for 
the program. These values are in line with the findings of Vasquez et al. (2009) and other studies 






Table 10: Estimated Value of the Program 
 Conditional Logit Mixed Logit 
VARIABLE Xalapa Coatepec Xalapa Coatepec 
Overall Value 88.05 172.21 91.48 154.85 
Overall Value as a % of 
Income 2.35% 4.59% 2.44% 4.13% 
Values reported in 2018 MXN. 1 USD ≈ 19 MXN. 
  
 
Chapter V. Discussion 
 
Discussion of Results 
We designed an in-person choice experiment that was implemented in Xalapa and Coatepec, 
Veracruz, Mexico. Using this data, we used choice models to estimate households’ preferences 
and welfare measures for a hypothetical payment for hydrological services program. This 
method allows us to evaluate the tradeoffs between the attributes that consumers experience 
when choosing a program that maximizes their utility. Determining the consumer preferences 
and value for hydrological services serves as an important step in establishing PHS programs that 
are sustainable in the long run.  
We find that, in the pooled sample, households’ have positive and statistically significant 
coefficients of improved water quality, improved water regulation services, adding an NGO to 
the program administration, and the addition of shade-grown coffee to the eligible land of the 
program. When we separate the results into Xalapa and Coatepec, the coefficient for the Eligible 
Land variable changes to be significant for Coatepec but not Xalapa. In addition, the magnitude 
for the Program Administration for Coatepec is twice as large as Xalapa. Because Coatepec has 
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a history of program mismanagement, this finding aligns with that history. We also find that the 
Alternative Specific Constant is negative and significant, which suggests that respondents have a 
preference for a PHS program, rather than their status quo situation, regardless of the values of 
the attributes of the program. We also include individual characteristics in the model, interacted 
with the ASC, with age being the only feature that has a statistically significant effect on the 
choices of consumers.  
The results also indicate that consumers have a significantly higher willingness to pay 
than the current program fee. In Coatepec, the current fee is 2 MXN per month in the water bill, 
but the results indicate that the households mean WTP for a program with all of the desirable 
attributes range from 88 – 172 MXN which is 2.35 – 4.59% of the median household income of 
the sample. The combination of an NGO with a government agency, as opposed to just a 
government agency administering the program, is an attribute of the program that households are 
willing to pay for across all models and subsamples. This attribute had a mean WTP of 12-34 
MXN, which is a significant portion of their total WTP and close to what they are willing to pay 
for improved water quality and water regulation services. This result is also closely tied to the 
idea what Mexican citizens have distrust in their government (Meschoulam et al., 2015). As seen 
in Table 7, respondents have a lower level of trust in the government to implement this program 
than they do in an NGO in combination with the government.  
Using a split sample approach, we see the differences between the Xalapa and Coatepec 
which are in close geographic proximity. The most key result of this is that Coatepec has a 
sizable mean WTP for the addition of shade-grown coffee to the eligible land of the program, 
while Xalapa does not have any WTP for such program eligibility modification. Coatepec is one 
of the oldest coffee-producing regions in the state of Veracruz and has a long history of its land 
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being used for coffee production (Hausermann, 2014). The significant WTP for the Eligible 
Land variable in Coatepec suggests that coffee farming is a cultural ecosystem service for the 
residents of Coatepec, a non-use value that consumers have due to their cultural identity being 
associated with this ecosystem. Also, due to the fact that Coatepec has a lower median household 
income than Xalapa, this is not merely an income effect.  
There are a few limitations with our study that should be addressed. First, the use of an 
Orthogonal Main Effects Design comes with the strong assumption that there are no interactions 
between attributes. In reality, it could be that consumers perceive a correlation between outcome 
variables and process-based variables, which Grolleau and Caswell (2006) argue would create a 
substitution or complementarity effect of the interactions of these attributes. Analyzing whether 
this is the case with respect to PHS program preferences would only be possible with the use of 
interaction terms in the model. The conditional logit model design also limits us to individual 
characteristics entering the model only as interactions with the ASC because they do not vary by 
individual. Another option is to interact individual characteristics with attributes. However, this 
can lead to estimation difficulties and collinearity issues, so we do not attempt this. Finally, 
stated preference studies are known to deal with hypothetical bias and difficulties in describing 
complex ecological interactions. We attempted to mitigate these as much as possible with 
recommendations and guidance of Johnston et al., (2017) by allowing the respondents to choose 
a clearly outlined status quo option, describing the specific payment vehicle that allows for 
incentive compatibility (mandatory fee installed in water bill), and by using focus group 
meetings to test the validity of the survey. One potential change, in future choice experiments, 
would be to have implemented a more robust pretesting phase in order to obtain design priors. 
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This would allow for a greater degree of statistical efficiency in the estimation and fewer 
necessary observations to estimate the model which can save time and resources.  
Our study is one of the first to use a choice experiment to measure the value of 
hydrological services in Mexico while utilizing both program outcome and program 
administration variables. While the program outcomes, expectedly, have significant WTP, the 
program administration variables have an impact on the public support and policy implications 
of future PHS programs.  
 
Policy Implications 
Our research has shown that the downstream water users in an area serve as a viable option for 
substantially extending the financial base of a PHS program. Evaluating the total economic value 
of ecosystem services and revising the level payments to landowners are two of the key policy 
improvements that are recommended in the future in order to make PES programs in Mexico 
more effective and efficient (Lara-Pulido, 2018). By incorporating non-use value and estimating 
the total economic value of hydrological services, our results are key to the incorporation of 
rigorous studies in the design and revision of PHS programs in Mexico. 
 Our results also highlight the need to take local perceptions as well as income inequality 
into consideration in the design and promotion of PHS programs. Local values are important in 
quantifying the full benefits of programs and can be used to justify higher payments than can be 
used to expand both the level of payments and the lands that are eligible to enroll in the program. 
For example, in Coatepec, using the enrollment of shade-grown coffee should be considered to 
not only increase willingness to pay but also to expand the program to provide greater 
hydrological services in the watershed. The consideration of income inequality is important in 
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policy implementation, especially in Mexico. Mexico has an estimated Gini index of 48.2 which 
ranks them the 24th most unequal country in the world, worse than many less developed African 
and Central/South American countries (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). The severe income 
inequality in Mexico combined with the fact that our estimates are mean WTP may complicate 
the implementation of the study results. Low-income households may not be able to pay for this 
program if a uniform fee was implemented.   
 
Future Work 
One potential avenue of future research is to extend the choice experiment to analyze dynamic 
preferences in response to a treatment effect. Because CE’s are a static value of preferences, little 
is known about whether, how or why preferences change over time. Combining a choice 
experiment with a social science method such as a role-play simulation (RPS) could be useful to 
see how preferences change when consumers are exposed to opposing viewpoints of 
stakeholders in the policy-making process. Discrete choice analysis and social science techniques 
could combine to develop a behavioral nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) that is experiential in 
nature (e.g., empathy) and too complex to be adequately expressed in a survey statement. Such 
complex nudges might have the effect of influencing behavior and promoting change with 
respect to PES programs in Veracruz and across the world to better conserve our natural 
resources. 
 Another aspect of this work that can be improved in the future is the welfare calculations. 
Recent developments in choice modeling have attempted to resolve the problem that, with 
estimated parameters being random variables, the distribution of the ratio to calculate WTP is not 
clear (Armstrong et al., 2001). This issue becomes worse parameters are assumed random as in 
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the mixed logit model (Sillano & D Ortúzar, 2005). Using simulation maximum-likelihood and 
Bayesian estimation procedures can yield more accurate estimates. 
 Finally, one aspect of the mixed logit model that was not utilized in this analysis is the 
use of individual characteristics as a function of the program variables. For example, allowing 
the program variables to be a function of income would allow for our estimates to better handle 
the issue of income inequality in our sample. This would make WTP estimates more amenable to 
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Payments for Hydrological Services in Veracruz, Mexico 
 
Hello, we are researchers in a joint project between the University of New Hampshire in the U.S.A., and 
Instituto de Ecología in Veracruz, Mexico, we thank you for taking the time to complete this survey.  
 
Forest cover is associated with the capture and storage of rainwater and therefore fewer problems with 
floods and droughts. Forests also act as natural filters of rain runoff and associated contaminants and can 
help reduce soil erosion, helping to ensure water quality and reducing the associated treatment cost to 
water users. Despite the importance of these services provided by forest cover, forested land is being 
replaced by other land uses which do not provide these services. Since both water supply and quality are 
important to the well-being of water users in towns and cities, local governments have worked with the 
National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) to establish programs making Payments for Hydrological 
Services (PHS) that provide landowners with forest land an economic incentive to conserve their forest 
and ensure hydrological services for downstream users. These agreements have important consequences 
for water quantity and quality. Your responses to this survey can help improve PHS programs in the 
future.  
 
The purpose of this survey is to understand which aspects of the PHS programs are important to the 
citizens of (insert city here). Your responses will be important to the accuracy of our research project as 
well as improving the effectiveness of (Insert city here). PHS program. We will share the results of our 
research with the local and national institutions administering PHS programs and they might use your 
responses to improve the design of these programs in the future, including a fee that acts as a PHS. 
Participation in this survey is voluntary and you may choose to skip any questions which you do not feel 
comfortable answering. Individual responses will not be made available. Only summary statistics will be 
reported in publications or presentations produced from this project and will be shared for informing 
public policy. 
 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential.  
 
If you have any issues while completing this survey, please ask the surveyor who provided you the 
survey. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject, you can contact Melissa McGee in 
UNH Research Integrity Services at 603-862-2005 or melissa.mcgee@unh.edu to discuss them. If you 






Shadi S. Atallah, University of New Hampshire 
email: Shadi.Atallah@unh.edu 
 
Ian R. McGinnis, University of New Hampshire 
email: irm1006@wildcats.unh.edu 
 
Robert Manson, Instituto de Ecología 





1. Do you live in (insert city here), Veracruz, Mexico? 
• Yes 
• No 
If you answered NO to the question above, please stop now. 
 
2. Do you pay the water bill for your household? 
• Yes 
• No 
































SECTION A - Hydrological Services Information 
 
 













• I don’t know 
 


















If Yes, please select below which recreation activities you have used water for in the last 12 months: 
• Hiking 
• Bird Watching 







SECTION B - Hydrological Services Decisions 
 
The PHS program for conserving forested land could have beneficial effects on the quality and quantity of 
water available to you, but this program is not free. If approved, additional costs for improving the program 
will be paid for through fees charged to local water users, one fee per household. We would like to know 
how you feel about the program. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. We want your honest opinion about this program. Please treat your 
choice as if you would actually have to pay for the program you chose. Also, please keep your budget in 
mind and tell us which option you would choose. Thank you and if you have any questions, please ask your 
surveyor.  
 
For the following choice set questions, you will be asked to consider the following attributes:  
 
1. Water Quality Change – Due to the natural filtration of the forests, an improved PHS program can 
improve the water quality in your community. Improved indicates an improvement in the water 
quality, while No Change indicates your current water quality. 
 
2. Water Regulation Service – Forests help to provide more reliable water during dry seasons and less 
water during flood seasons. A program could be specially designed to target this service of the 
forest, so water regulation services are Improved, and you experience fewer droughts and floods, or 
No Change so you receive no change from your current flood and drought issues.  
 
3. Program Administration – A program could either be run by a local Government Agency, or by a 
local government agency with a Non-governmental organization (NGO). 
 
4. Eligible Land – The land that is eligible for PHS programs include may include typical Forest land 
(current plan) or to include Forest and Shade-grown coffee farms that could also help regulate 
water quality and quantity. 
 
5. Additional Fee – This is the additional fee that would be added to your regular monthly water bill. 




For the following, Option 3 refers to your current situation. Choosing this option means you would 
experience no change from your current water situation and water bill, meaning no improved hydrological 
services, no changes in program administration or eligible land, and no additional fees. If neither of the 














1. Please consider the following program adjustments and choose the option you most prefer. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Water Quality  No Change Improved 
I would not choose 




Improved No Change 
Program Administration Government NGO 
Eligible Land Shade-grown coffee Forest 
Additional Fee $40 $80 
I prefer:    
 
If you answered Option 3, please select why you chose this answer (choose all that apply) 
o Options 1 and 2 are too expensive 
o I do not understand the program’s objective 
o I do not care about hydrological services or watershed quality 
o I do not support any tax-funded programs 




2. Please consider the following program adjustments and choose the option you most prefer. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Water Quality Change No Change Improved 
I would not choose 
Option 1 or  
Option 2 
Water Regulation 
Service No Change Improved 
Program Administration Government NGO 
Eligible Land Forest Shade-grown coffee 
Additional Fee $5 $20 
I prefer:    
 
If you answered Option 3, please select why you chose this answer (choose all that apply) 
o Options 1 and 2 are too expensive 
o I do not understand the program’s objective 
o I do not care about hydrological services or watershed quality 
o I do not support any tax-funded programs 
o I do not care about forests 











3. Please consider the following program adjustments and choose the option you most prefer. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Water Quality Change Improved No Change 
I would not choose 
Option 1 or  
Option 2 
Water Regulation 
Service Improved No Change 
Program Administration NGO Government 
Eligible Land Shade-grown coffee Forest 
Additional Fee $5 $20 
I prefer:    
 
If you answered Option 3, please select why you chose this answer (choose all that apply) 
o Options 1 and 2 are too expensive 
o I do not understand the program’s objective 
o I do not care about hydrological services or watershed quality 
o I do not support any tax-funded programs 
o I do not care about forests 
o Other (please specify below): 
 
________________________________ 
4. Please consider the following program adjustments and choose the option you most prefer. 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
Water Quality Change Improved No Change 
I would not choose 
Option 1 or  
Option 2 
Water Regulation 
Service No Change Improved 
Program Administration NGO Government 
Eligible Land Forest Shade-grown coffee 
Additional Fee $40 $80 
I prefer:    
 
If you answered Option 3, please select why you chose this answer (choose all that apply) 
o Options 1 and 2 are too expensive 
o I do not understand the program’s objective 
o I do not care about hydrological services or watershed quality 




o I do not care about forests 









If Yes, which attributes did you ignore? 
 
_____ Water Quality Change 
_____ Water Regulation Service 
_____ Program Administration 

























Respondent Background Information 
 























6. What is your marital status? 
• Single 
• Married/Living with a partner 
• Divorced/Separated/Widowed 
 




8. What level of education have you finished? 
• Elementary School 
• Middle School 
• High School 
• University degree 
• Graduate degree (MA, MS, Ph. D, JD, MD, etc.) 
 
9. Please circle the response that best describes your employment status: 
• Employed full-time 
• Employed part-time 
• Unemployed seeking work 
• Student 
• Retired 
• Not seeking a job 
• Other: _______________________ 
 
10. Which of the following statements do you think is more accurate?  





b.   I have a little trust in a municipal government agency to administer a Payment for Hydrologic al 
Services program. 
c.     I have moderate trust in a municipal government agency to administer a Payment for 
Hydrological Services program. 
d.    I have a lot of trust in a municipal government agency to administer a Payment for Hydrological 
Services program. 
e.    Don’t know/No answer 
 
11. Which of the following statements do you think is more accurate? 
a.    I do not trust a combination of a non-governmental organization and municipal government 
agency to administer a Payment for Hydrological Services program. 
b.    I have a little trust in a combination of a non-governmental organization and municipal 
government agency to administer a Payment for Hydrological Services program. 
c.     I have moderate trust a combination of a non-governmental organization and municipal 
government agency to administer a Payment for Hydrological Services program. 
d.    I have a lot of trust in a combination of a non-governmental organization and municipal 
government agency to administer a Payment for Hydrological Services program. 
e.    Don’t know/No answer 
 








14. Please circle the response that best describes your current monthly household income: 
• Less than 2,500 MXN 
• Between 2,500 and 5,000 MXN 
• Between 5,000 and 7,500 MXN 
• Between 7,500 and 10,000 MXN 
• Between 10,000 and 15,000 MXN 
• More than 15,000 MXN 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey! 






Appendix B. Focus Group Consent Form 
  
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATION IN A RESEARCH STUDY
 
RESEARCHER AND TITLE OF STUDY 
My name is Shadi Atallah and I am a professor at the University of New Hampshire and the title 
of this study is “Households’ preferences and willingness to pay for hydrological services in 
Veracruz.” This study is funded by the University of New Hampshire and the National Science 
Foundation of the USA.  
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS FORM? 
This consent form describes the research study and helps you to decide if you want to participate.  
It provides important information about what you will be asked to do in the study, about the risks 
and benefits of participating in the study, and about your rights as a research participant.  You 
should: 
• Read the information in this document carefully. 
• Ask the research personnel any questions, particularly if you do not understand 
something. 
• Not agree to participate until all your questions have been answered, or until you are sure 
that you want to.  
• Understand that your participation in this study involves you giving feedback on a survey 
that will last about three hours. 
 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY? 
The purpose of this research is to understand households’ preferences for a payment program 
that can keep or improves the consistent supply of water and its quality. We plan to conduct 
surveys in Coatepec and Xalapa to collect information on households' perceived benefits of 
improved water quantity and quality. Focus group and survey participants will be given the 
opportunity to express their concern regarding these issues. It is hoped that the information 
collected from the survey respondents will be valuable to the water companies, municipalities, 
and and policy makers in improving the consistent supply of hydrological services in Veracruz. 
 
We anticipate 8-10 people to participate in the focus groups. Participants must be at least 18 
years old to participate in the study. 
 
WHAT DOES YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY INVOLVE? 
Your participation in the focus groups is important to make sure that the survey we have 
prepared is written in a way that reflects the reality of and language used by households. We 
would also like to learn your opinions on forest conservation and hydrological ecosystems 
services. Specifically, we will ask you to:  
 
(1) read the survey individually; (2) discuss in small groups with the other landowners on your 




be changed; (3) participate in a session led by a moderator to come to a consensus among all the 
small groups.   
 
The exercise is expected to take three hours including a break.  
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS OF PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?  
Participation in this study is expected to present minimal risks to you such as those associated 
with sitting on a chair. 
 
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY? 
This project will provide information on households’ potential support for a payment program 
for forest landowners in Veracruz. If implemented, such program can conserve forests and 
therefore increase the quality of water and its quantity during drought periods.   
Focus group participants will be given the opportunity to express their opinions and concerns 
regarding these issues of forest conservation and water supply and quality. It is hoped that the 
information collected from the respondents will be valuable to the policy makers in designing 
payments for hydrological services that help insure water supply and quality in Veracruz.  
 
WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATING IN THIS STUDY?  
There is no monetary compensation for participating in this study.  
 
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?  
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary.  You may choose not to take part at all.  If you 
agree to participate, you may refuse to answer any question.  If you decide not to participate, you 
will not be penalized or lose any benefits for which you would otherwise qualify. 
 
CAN YOU WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY?  
If you agree to participate in this study and you then change your mind, you may stop 
participating at any time. Any data collected as part of your participation will remain part of the 
study records.  If you decide to stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized or lose 
any benefits for which you would otherwise qualify.  
 
HOW WILL THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF YOUR RECORDS BE PROTECTED?  
I plan to maintain the confidentiality of all data and records associated with your participation in 
this research.   
 
There are, however, rare instances when I may be required to share personally-identifiable 
information with the following:  
• Officials at the University of New Hampshire, 
• The sponsor(s), or 
• Regulatory and oversight government agencies.   
 
While I plan to maintain confidentiality of your responses, other focus group participants may 
repeat responses outside the focus group setting.   
 




called UNH Box; UNH project investigators Dr. Shadi S. Atallah, Dr. Ju-Chin Huang, Dr. 
Catherine Ashcraft and Graduate Students Ian McGinnis and Andres Urcuqui will have access to 
the data; De-identified data might be shared with other researchers on the project; audio-
recording will be transcribed and then destroyed. I will report the data in aggregate and using 
pseudonyms. The results may be used in reports and presentations and will be used to adjust the 
survey.   
 
WHOM TO CONTACT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY 
If you have any questions pertaining to the research, you can contact Dr. Shadi S. Atallah (+1-
603-862-3233; shadi.atallah@unh.edu) to discuss them.   
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research subject you can contact Melissa McGee in 
UNH Research Integrity Services, 603-862-2005 or melissa.mcgee@unh.edu to discuss them.   
 
I have enclosed two copies of this letter.  Please sign one indicating your choice and return in the 
enclosed envelope.  The other copy is for your records.  
 
   
Yes, I, __________________________consent/agree to participate in this research project. 
 
No, I, __________________________do not consent/agree to participate in this research project. 
 
___________________________   __________________ 







Appendix C. IRB Approval Letter 
University of New Hampshire 
  
Research Integrity Services, Service Building 





NREN, James Hall 
56 College Rd 
Durham, NH 03824 
  
IRB #: 6983   
Study: Households' Willingness to Pay for Hydrological Services in Veracruz, Mexico 
Approval Expiration Date: 27-Jun-2019 
Modification Approval Date: 23-Aug-2018 
Modification: Per memo Request 8/8/18 
  
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research (IRB) has 
reviewed and approved your modification to this study, as indicated above.  Further changes in 
your study must be submitted to the IRB for review and approval prior to implementation.  
  
Approval for this protocol expires on the date indicated above. At the end of the 
approval period you will be asked to submit a report with regard to the involvement of human 
subjects in this study.  If your study is still active, you may request an extension of IRB 
approval. 
  
Researchers who conduct studies involving human subjects have responsibilities as outlined in 
the document, Responsibilities of Directors of Research Studies Involving Human Subjects.  This 
document is available at http://unh.edu/research/irb-application-resources or from me.  
  
Note: IRB approval is separate from UNH Purchasing approval of any proposed methods of 
paying study participants.  Before making any payments to study participants, researchers 
should consult with their BSC or UNH Purchasing to ensure they are complying with institutional 
requirements. If such institutional requirements are not consistent with the confidentiality or 
anonymity assurances in the IRB-approved protocol and consent documents, the researcher 
may need to request a modification from the IRB. 
  
If you have questions or concerns about your study or this approval, please feel free to contact 
Melissa McGee at 603-862-2005 or melissa.mcgee@unh.edu.  Please refer to the IRB # above 
in all correspondence related to this study.  The IRB wishes you success with your research. 
  









     , 
     Atallah, Shady 
 
